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1.  Introduction 
Thirty  years  ago,  many  poor  and  middle  income  countries,  covering  a  large  share  of  the 
world’s rural areas and poor people, were heavily state-controlled.  This was most extreme in 
the  Communist  world,  spreading  from  Central  Europe  to  East  Asia,  where  the  entire 
economic system was under strict control of the state.  However, also in many African, Latin-
American and South Asian countries the state played a very important role in the economy.  
The first major liberalization started in Indonesia in 1968.  Some years later, Sri Lanka 
also implemented liberalization policies.  In 1978, China embarked on its reform path by 
property right reforms, liberalization and a reduction of price distortions in the economy.  
Vietnam followed in the mid 1980s. The impact has been dramatic.  In particular the reforms 
in China and Vietnam have been heralded as lifting hundreds of millions of people out of dire 
poverty (World Bank, 2000); as “the biggest antipoverty program the world has ever seen” 
(McMillan, 2002, p.94) and as having led to “the greatest increase in economic well-being 
within a 15-year period in all of history” (Fischer, 1994, p.131). 
The expectations were high when countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE)  and  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  introduced  a  series  of 
reforms  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  to  remove  state  intervention  and  distortions  of  producer 
incentives.    Those  distortions  had  been  argued  to  be  a  major  constraint  on  productivity, 
income growth and poverty reduction (eg Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988; Lipton, 1977). 
The liberalization of trade, prices, and exchange rates, and the removal of state control over 
the commodity chains were to improve incentives to farmers and to yield growth, thereby 
raising incomes and reducing poverty (Timmer, 1986; Commander, 1989).       3
However, the effects of the reforms were very different from what was expected ex 
ante.  In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the reforms caused a dramatic decline 
in  economic  output  and  incomes  and  led  to  a  general  increase  in  poverty  following  the 
liberalization reforms (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).    
In Africa, the effects of the liberalizations – often imbedded in structural adjustment 
programs – were also disappointing.  Barrett (1998) argues that, by the mid 1990s, evidence 
was  inconclusive  whether  market-oriented  reforms  brought  either  poverty  reduction  or 
economic growth in SSA. While the World Bank (1994) claimed evidence of real economic 
growth in response to the reforms, others argued that liberalization has intensified suffering 
among poor farmers (Cornia et al, 1987; Duncan and Howell, 1992; Stewart, 1995).  In an 
excellent review of the empirical evidence, Kherallah et al. (2002) conclude that, after two 
decades of reforms in SSA, while there is some progress in most cases, the general consensus 
is that market reforms have not met expectations in SSA.   
  Interestingly,  there  has  been  hardly  any  attempt  to  compare  the  results  of  the 
liberalizations across these regions. Reforms have been compared within regions and between 
Europe and Asia, but there have been hardly any attempts to include Africa.
1 In addition, the 
analyses of the unexpectedly poor effects of liberalization in CEE and FSU on the one hand, 
and SSA on the other hand, have developed into quite different types of literatures with little 
cross-fertilization.    The  analyses  of  the  impact  of  liberalization  in  Africa  were  mostly 
empirical studies (e.g. Barrett, 1997; Jayne et al., 2003; Kherallah et al., 2002) analyzing how 
various factors can contribute to explain the (lack of) supply response to the market reforms 
in Africa.  In contrast, the poor performance of the Eastern European and Soviet reforms has, 
                                                 
1 Reforms have been compared within Asia (e.g. Green and Vokes, 1998), Africa (e.g. Kherallah et al 2002), 
Europe (e.g. Lerman, Csaki and Feder, 2004; Macours and Swinnen, 2000), and between Europe and Asia (de 
Melo and Gelb, 1996; de Melo et al, 2001; Macours and Swinnen, 2002; Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).  In 
particular the comparison between China on the one hand and Russia and East Europe on the other has triggered 
a large set of papers, including Dewatripont and Roland (1995), Fischer (1994), Qian, Roland and Xu (1999) and 
Sachs and Woo (1994). However, there have been hardly any attempts to include Africa, with the exception of 
Ravallion (2008).     4
besides a series of empirical studies on the causes of the declines in output and productivity 
(e.g. Macours and Swinnen, 2000), sparked an important theoretical literature on the role of 
institutions and how they have affected the outcomes of the reform process (e.g. Blanchard, 
1997; Roland, 2000).   
An important insight of the theoretical analyses of the reforms in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union is the important role of the change in institutions for governing exchange in 
the economy and the inherent problems and costs that come with such institutional changes.
2  
These insights appear to be highly relevant for understanding the effects of the liberalization 
and reform programs in Africa since the liberalization of trade, prices and markets have been 
associated  with  important  changes  in  the  institutions  that  organize  exchanges  in  the 
commodity sectors, such as the removal of state control from international and domestic trade 
and marketing of outputs and the provision of inputs.  Indeed, there is considerable discussion 
in the empirical studies on the role of the institutional organization of the African economy 
and  how  it  affected  the  liberalization  outcomes.  However,  there  has  been  no  attempt  to 
formally model this interaction and to draw implications from it.     
The objective of this paper is therefore two-fold. The first objective is to compare the 
relative reform performance across Africa, Asia and Europe. The paper presents a series of 
indicators  to  compare  changes  in  output  and  productivity  during  the  reform  period.  The 
second objective is to contribute to an explanation of the differences in reform performance 
by relating these performance indicators to the actual reforms. For this, we develop a general 
model which allows to formally analyze how liberalization affects production and income 
                                                 
2 Seminal papers explaining the importance of these factors as causes of economic declines in the midst of 
market reforms are Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999).  Gow and Swinnen (1998, 
2001) used similar arguments to explain the decline, and subsequent recovery, of the agri-food sectors in Eastern 
Europe. Macours and Swinnen (2002) and Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) explain how the differences between 
China on the one hand and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the other hand in the liberalizing of 
prices  and  reform  market  institutions  has  contributed  importantly  to  the  different  performances  of  these 
countries. 
   5
distribution when liberalization affects the institutions that govern production and exchange.  
Specifically, our model integrates key institutional and structural characteristics of developing 
and transition countries. The first element is that in the pre-reform system, inputs were often 
provided to farmers through vertically coordinated exchange mechanisms with monopolistic 
and state-controlled organizations. As we will show, in such an institutional environment, 
liberalization of the output market will also affect the supply of inputs, which has important 
indirect effects on production.  It is well documented now that farmers in Eastern Europe and 
in Africa had major problems accessing production factors (such as credit, technology, seeds, 
fertilizer, etc) after the liberalizations. These empirical observations are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of our model.  
The  second  institutional  element  is  the  governance  of  contract  enforcement.    The 
liberalization process implied an important change in the organization of exchange in the 
economy, and had major implications for the institutions to enforce contracts.  In general, 
institutions to enforce state controlled exchanges became less important and institutions to 
enforce private exchanges were weak or absent in these countries, since it takes much longer 
to create such institutions than it takes to liberalize the trading system. As we will show, the 
implications of this are very important for understanding the impact of liberalization.   
Our model will integrate these key institutional characteristics of the liberalization 
process.  Using the model, we will derive hypotheses on how these characteristics affect the 
supply response to the liberalization, and, how the supply response is affected by product 
characteristics.  We use these insights to offer hypotheses to explain empirical observations 
on post-reform performance. We believe that these insights are not only very important to 
understand the causes of the poor performance of the agricultural markets in many parts of the 
world, including in parts of Africa, in response to the reforms, but are also important as 
predictions for future developments – and hence as a framework for evaluating policy options.    6
For  example,  the  initial  output  decline  has  been  reversed  in  most  of  the  transition 
economies—albeit with substantial variation among them, reflecting differences in policies 
and structural conditions—and they have now shown robust growth over several years.   Our 
analysis also provides arguments why the reversal to growth after the initial decline was most 
rapid and strongest in Central and Eastern Europe, and why such reversal was more difficult 
in Africa.   
Our analysis relates to a number of recent papers trying to draw lessons from the 
Chinese experience for Africa, such as Ravallion (2008).  Our analysis is complementary in 
that it focuses on more countries, not just China, and offers a formal theoretical model and a 
more detailed empirical comparison.   
While several of the arguments in this paper apply to the economy as a whole, the 
focus  is  on  agriculture.  Focusing  on  agriculture  to  analyze  which  policies  contribute  to 
success and failure of economic reform has several benefits.  First, the sharpness of the policy 
changes in agriculture and the fundamental differences among countries provide a good test. 
Second, the relative simplicity of agricultural relationships–a farm is an easier production 
entity to analyze than an industrial firm–also adds clarity to the analysis.   Third, a study 
focussing  on  agriculture  is  also  inherently  interesting  for  those  studying  economic 
development and poverty reduction.  There is now wide agreement that agricultural (rural) 
growth is crucial for poverty reduction in developing countries (Ravallion, 2008; World Bank, 
2008).   Finally, for many countries covered by our analysis, such as in Africa and in East and 
Central Asia, agriculture dominated the economy during reforms and the changes in the sector 
have had an important impact on overall economic performance.  When more than 50 percent 
of a nation’s labour force is employed in agriculture, and when the major share of consumer 
income is spent on food, successful agricultural reform can have a major impact on poverty 
reduction and the welfare of the population. Hence, instead of being a limitation, our analysis   7
of liberalization in agriculture will yield important general lessons for those interested in the 
more fundamental relationships between reform, institutional change and growth. 
  The paper is organized as follows. We start by describing and comparing post-reform 
agricultural  performance  in  different  transition  and  developing  regions.  We  continue  by 
developing a model of vertically coordinated markets.  Then we relate this model to the pre-
liberalization  situation  in  developing  and  transition  countries,  we  discuss  how  to  model 
“liberalization”, and we show the aggregate effect on supply response and how this may be 
affected by several factors.  We relate these findings to empirical observations on agricultural 
performance  and  on  variations  in  commodity  chain  performance  across  countries  and 
commodities. Then, we draw conclusions.  
 
2.  Regional trends in post-reform agricultural performance 
Remarkable  differences  are  observed  when  examining  the  performance  of  agriculture  in 
different  transition  and  developing  regions  in  the  years  after  these  regions  embarked  on 
agricultural  reforms  and  structural  adjustment  programs.  We  look  at  several  performance 
indicators:  output,  output  per  capita,  land  productivity  (yields),  labour  productivity,  and, 
where available, total factor productivity (TFP). For each country, we have chosen the year of 
the start of the reforms as year 0. For China, the first year of reform is set to 1978. The first 
year of reform is set to 1985 for Vietnam, 1989 for non-FSU Central & Eastern Euroopean 
countries, and 1991 for FSU countries. For Sub Sahara Africa, the year in which a country got 
a first structural adjustment loan from the World Bank is taken as the first year of reform. 
This information was collected from World Bank loan documents. 
Agricultural  output  increased  rapidly  in  the  years  after  the  start  of  reform  and 
liberalization  programs  (Figure  1)  in  East  Asian  (EA)  transition  countries  –  in  particular 
China and Vietnam. On the contrary, in countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and   8
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) agricultural output fell sharply in the initial years of transition 
to stagnate and recover slightly in subsequent years
3. On average in CEE and FSU countries, 
after a decade of reform, agricultural output was 20% lower than at the start of transition; 
while in the same time span in China and Vietnam output increased respectively 60% and 
40% above its initial pre-reform level. Also, in per capita terms, output fell sharply in CEE 
and FSU – even more so in FSU – compared to a sharp increase in per capita output in EA 
(Figure 2). 
The performance of Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) countries that embarked on structural 
adjustment and agricultural liberalization has been in between the EA and the CEE / FSU 
experience. On average, output grew in SSA countries but at a slower pace than in China and 
Vietnam and reaching 35% of its initial pre-reform level after a decade of reform (Figure 1). 
However, in per capita terms the output growth in SSA is much less spectacular
4 – virtually 
non-existent even (Figure 2). The flat time trend for per capita output changes in SSA is in 
sharp contrast with the positive trend in EA. However, it is still much better than the negative 
trend in CEE and FSU countries.  
Comparing productivity indicators further nuances the story. In line with their trend of 
sharp output growth, China and Vietnam experienced strong increases in agricultural labor 
productivity  and in  yields (Figure 3 & Figure  4). However, also in CEE countries, labor 
productivity and especially yields increased dramatically, also in CEE countries, albeit after 
an initial period of decline lasting for 3 years on average. The period of productivity decline 
(and stagnation) has been longer for FSU countries (about 5 to 7 years on average) and the 
decline was stronger than in CEE. However, afterwards these countries seem to follow the 
same path of productivity growth as in EA and CEE.  
                                                 
3 While the general trend of output fall is the same for CEE and FSU countries, there are differences in the length 
of time between the start of reform and the bottom of the time trend, and the extent of output recovery between 
sub-regions and countries. These are described in Rozelle and Swinnen (2004). 
4  Differences  in  time  trends  between  output  and  per  capita  output  growth  are  explained  by  differences  in 
population growth which has been much higher in SSA than anywhere else.   9
The indicators in Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicate that the average productivity in SSA 
has not declined, as in CEE and FSU, but has increased since the start of the reforms. This 
increase has however been much slower than in either East Asia, or CEE and FSU once they 
started growing again. 
Finally, Figure 5 presents data on land use. The sharp agricultural output growth in EA 
is composed of sharp productivity growth and only modest increases in the agricultural area. 
In  contrast,  the  growth  of  SSA  agricultural  output  can  be  attributed  mainly  to  acreage 
expansion,  while  only  slight  improvements  in  labor  and  land  productivity  were  realized. 
Reform processes in CEE and FSU have resulted in a significant decrease of the cultivated 
area.  
Finally,  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  is  the  most  comprehensive  indicator  of 
productivity, but comparative and reliable estimates of TFP are scarce because of data and 
methodological problems.  For some transition countries TFP measures and the data needed to 
calculate TFP measures are simply not available.  For those countries in which TFP series are 
available, in some cases, comparisons have to be done carefully because of differences in 
methodologies, time frames, sampling and commodity coverage.   
Whatever  TFP  evidence is  available  in  the  literature  shows  that  TFP  trends  move 
largely in the same direction as the partial measures. In China, during the first years after 
reform  (1978  to  1984),  TFP  measures  of  productivity  rose  by  5  to  10  percent  per  year.  
During the 1990s, TFP continues to rise at a rate of around 2 percent per year.
5  During the 
early reform period in Vietnam (1980 to 1985), TFP rose by 2 to 3 percent annually and 
continued to rise later (Benjamin and Brandt, 2001; Pingali and Xuan, 1992). 
Estimates of TFP changes in CEE and SSA also show that measures of TFP generally 
move in a manner consistent with the partial ones.  Macours and Swinnen (2000) estimate that 
                                                 
5 Several series of TFP estimates have been produced for China’s agriculture (McMillan et al., 1989; Fan, 1991; 
Lin, 1992; Wen, 1993; Huang and Rozelle, 1996; Fan, 1997; Jin et al., 2002).   10
TFP indices in Central European agriculture decline during the first three years of transition 
(between 1989 and 1991) by 2.3 percent annually.  The indices, however, rebound strongly 
after three years of reforms, rising by 4.5 percent annually between 1992 and 1995.
6  For 
SSA, Nin Pratt and Yu (2008) estimate that average TFP in agriculture declined consistently 
in the 1960s and the 1970s. TFP has rebounded since the early 1980s, but slower than in Asia 
or Europe. The average TFP growth rate was around 1% per year over the past 20 years in 
SSA.   
In summary, the available TFP evidence is consistent with the conclusions from the 
analysis of the partial indicators: strong productivity growth since the start of the reforms in 
East Asia (China and Vietnam), initial decline and then strong recovery in CEE, and slow but 
steady productivity growth in SSA since the mid 1980s.   
 
3.  A model of liberalization
7 
The previous section showed that there are important differences among regions (East-Asia, 
Africa and Europe) and among sectors within the same region, in how the reforms affected 
economic performance.  
 
3.1. Characteristics of the pre-liberalization economy 
To use a model for explaining reform effects, it is important to take into account the specific 
characteristics of the pre-liberalization economies. Although there are important differences 
across regions in certain attributes of the pre-reform economy (see further), countries in CEE, 
FSU, EA and SSA had several characteristics in common – specifically on the governance of 
agri-food supply chains, which is relevant for our analysis.  
                                                 
6 The Balkan countries demonstrate a similar, but more pronounced pattern, falling by around 7 percent annually 
over the first three years before increasing by more than 7 percent annually during the subsequent three years. 
Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) review TFP evidence for the FSU where studies yield mixed results, mostly due to 
differences in datasets and methodologies.   
7 The model is based on Swinnen and Vandeplas (2007).    11
First, government institutions were monopoly buyers of agricultural products. This 
was most extreme in the Communist world, spreading from Central Europe to East Asia, 
where the entire agri-food system was under strict control of the state.  However, also in most 
African countries – as well as in many Latin-American and South Asian countries - the state 
played a very important role in the agri-food chains.  In the decades after independence from 
colonial power, governments in SSA regulated agricultural production, marketing and food 




Second, interlinking was widespread in these chains. Again this was most extreme in 
the Communist system where production at various stages and the exchange of inputs and 
outputs along the chain was coordinated and determined by the central command system.  The 
agricultural supply system was fully integrated and completely state-controlled (Rozelle and 
Swinnen,  2004).    Production,  processing,  marketing,  the  provision  of  inputs  and  credit, 
retailing, etc were all directed by the central planning authorities.  Although there were some 
variations in countries in the extent and scope of control, this was the basic system extending 
from  Central  Europe,  the  Soviet  Union  to  China  and  Vietnam.    However  also  in  SSA 
government  control  and  interlinking  in  food  supply  chains  was  widespread.  Many  of  the 
African parastatal organizations provided both inputs to farmers and purchased their outputs.
9 
                                                 
8 For example, marketing of grain and other basic food crops was controlled and organized by government 
marketing boards e.g. in Malawi, through ADMARC (Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation); in 
Zambia, through NAMBOARD (National Agricultural Marketing Board) and in Kenya through NCPB (National 
Cereals and Produce Board). Also marketing and processing of major export crops was in many countries state-
controlled  through  state-owned  processing  and  exporting  companies  and  organizations;  e.g.  for  cotton  in 
Malawi, through CMDT (Malawi Textile Development Company), in Cameroon, through SODECOTON, in 
Ghana, through the Ghana Cotton Development Board and in Kenya through CLSMB (Cotton Lint and Seed 
Marketing Board); for tea in Kenya, through KTDA (The Kenyan Tea Development Cooperation); for coffee 
through coffee marketing boards in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia; etc. In general, in SSA, these 
government controlled monopoly organizations were especially important for basic urban food crops, such as 
cereals, and for important export crops, such as cacao, coffee, cotton, etc; they were less important for crops as 
yam, cassava, etc. 
9 For example, the government marketing boards ADMARC in Malawi and NAMBOARD in Zambia provided 
seasonal inputs to peasant farmers deducting the value of the inputs from the payment made for marketed output 
at harvest time. Also parastatal cotton companies such as CMDT in Mali, SODECOTON in Cameroon and the   12
The dominant form (and often the only source of inputs and credit) was that of seasonal input 
and credit provisions by state-controlled organizations to small farmers in return for supplies 
of primary produce.  
Third, an important achievement (in historical perspective) of these systems was that 
they did manage to provide inputs and credits to farms, albeit in a costly way. The monopoly 
control contributed to enforcement of the interlinked contracts, but there were problems of 
high costs, enforcement problems with buyers (sometimes) paying with delays and farmers 
(sometimes) not repaying credit or inputs.
10   
Fourth, government control of the supply chains was also used to set prices, which 
contributed to massive distortions in agricultural markets.  State control of trade and prices in 
the chains were often motivated by political objectives, such as to provide cheap food for 
urban  markets;  the  maximization  of  foreign  exchange  earnings;  the  creation  of  rural 
employment;  ascertaining  the  viability  of  certain  businesses;  etc.    While  distortions  were 
present everywhere, the nature of the distortions differed strongly across countries. As we will 
document  further,  farmers  were  generally  taxed  before  the  reforms  in  Africa,  China  and 
Vietnam while farmers were subsidized in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  
 
3.2. The model 
We will now develop a theoretical model which incorporates these characteristics to explain 
why differences in pre-reform conditions, differences in specific reforms and differences in 
                                                                                                                                                          
Ghana Cotton Development Board in Ghana and the Kenyan Tea Development Cooperation provided credit and 
inputs to cotton farmers (Bauman, 2000; Poulton et al., 1998). 
10  In  Africa,  several  studies  conclude  that  state-controlled  outgrower  schemes  were  inefficient  and  poorly 
managed, while others point at successes of these systems (Bauman, 2000; Poulton et al, 1998; Warning and 
Key, 2002). Warning and Key (2002) find low repayment rates, while Poulton et al. (1998) and Baumann (2000) 
find that some large government outgrower schemes in resp. Malawi and Kenya were successful in achieving 
high repayment rates. Johnson and Brooks (1983) argue that the inefficiency in the processing and marketing 
systems and in the central allocation of production factors were one of the primary causes of the inefficiency of 
the Soviet farming complex. In many instances, there were problems with control of quality, etc.  
   13
commodity  characteristics,  in  particular  the  value  of  the  commodity  chain,  may  cause 
differences in reform effects.
11 
Consider the situation where a local household or farming company – which we refer 
to as “the farmer” – can sell farm products to a trader or a retailing or processing company – 
which we refer to as “the buyer”. This buyer sells the product (possibly after processing) to 
consumers – either domestically or internationally. For reasons of simplicity, we assume the 
farmer has the choice between producing a crop with low value added (referred to as “low 
value product”) or a crop with high value added (referred to as “high value product”). 
Define pl and ph as the per unit consumer prices of the low and high value products.  
Let m be the per unit “efficient” processing and extra transport costs; in other words, m covers 
the extra costs that are involved in producing the high value product and delivering it to 
consumers through an efficient market system.  We also introduce a cost term t, with t = tx + 
tm, where tx are government taxes or subsidies (tax for tx > 0 and subsidy for tx < 0),
12 And tm 
are excess processing and marketing costs, due to inefficiencies in the marketing chain.  
The production of high-value commodities requires some (specific) input use (e.g. 
fertilizers, credit, seeds, technology). Assume that to produce one unit of high value output, 
the farmer requires specific inputs with a value of I on top of his basic production cost C (e.g. 
labor, land) for production of the low value good. We assume that these specific inputs are not 
available to the farmer because of factor market imperfections. This assumption reflects the 
situation  in  many  developing  and  transition  countries  at  the  time of  the  reforms  as  local 
producers and households faced important factor market constraints. These constraints hurt 
                                                 
11 Our model is close to Kranton and Swamy (2008), but extends it by introducing a set of new parameters which 
are relevant to our analysis. 
12 We assume that the government does not impose taxes on low quality products.  This is a realistic assumption 
since such taxation may not be possible because low quality products may be importantly consumed in the 
household or in the local village.  It is also consistent with evidence showing that distortions are much more 
important in tradable commodities than in non-tradable commodities; as well as that there is an anti-trade bias in 
government policy (Anderson, 2006; Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1989).    14
both farmers and buyers: they prevent farmers from producing for the market and constrain 
access to raw materials for the processing firm.  
If  the  processing  firm  has  access  to  the  required  inputs,  the  buyer  can  act  as  an 
intermediary in the input market and provide (sell or lend) the inputs to the farmer. This, 
again, is a realistic case since the buyer may have better collateral, more cash flow or face 
lower transport or transaction costs in accessing the inputs. If so, the buyer will consider 
offering a contract to the farmer, which includes the provision of inputs and the conditions 
(time, amount and price) for purchasing the farmer’s product. We assume that the buyer either 
provides the farmer with the full amount of required inputs I per unit of production, or the 
buyer does not provide any inputs
13.  If the buyer and the farmer decide to collaborate, they 
can realize a joint surplus G, with  G = ph – m – I – C – t.  
To determine how this joint surplus G is divided, we need to take into account what 
each party could realize outside of the negotiation. Instead of signing an agreement with the 
concerned  buyer,  the  farmer  can  negotiate  a  contract  with  another  company,  or  continue 
producing  the  low-value  product  for  subsistence  or  for  the  local  market
14,  earning  the 
consumption value of the low-value produce pl at a cost C.  The farmer’s disagreement payoff 
is then Yl = αph – C, with α ≥ 0 an indicator of the alternative opportunities of the farmer. If 
the farmer’s only ex ante outside option is to produce low-value products for the local market, 
αph = pl.  Hence α ≥ pl / ph and α increases if the farmer has other interesting opportunities.
15  
                                                 
13 This implies that the application of any amount of inputs below the optimal amount of inputs I is resulting in a 
lack of marketable surplus. 
14 We assume the consumption value of the low-value product equals its local market price. 
15 More generally, one can show that, ceteris paribus, α is increasing in transaction costs to deal with other 
buyers (e.g. search costs, switching costs, transport costs), in the degree of supplier concentration, decreasing in 
the degree of buyer concentration (e.g. Inderst & Mazzarotto 2008), and higher if there are other buyers with 
access to high value markets (i.e. if the supplier’s bargaining partner is not the “gatekeeper” to the high value 
market (Mazzarotto 2004)).   15
Similarly,  the  buyer  may  have  other  opportunities.  We  denote  his  payoff  under 
disagreement as Πl = λph,
16 where λ ≥ 0 is an indicator which reflects the alternative options of 
the buyer: for example, λ is increasing in the number of suitable contract suppliers. The net 
surplus that can be achieved when bargaining is successful, is then S = G – Yl – Πl . This can 
be rewritten as:  
S = θ – I – t,                   (6) 
with θ an indicator for the relative value of the product (compared to alternative activities):  
θ = (1 – α – λ)ph – m               (7) 
In  a perfect enforcement setting, joint profits can be divided according to a simple Nash 
bargaining process with sharing rule β, such that the respective incomes of the supplier and 
the buyer under perfect enforcement are Ypf = Yl + βS and Πpf = Πl + (1 – β)S.
17 
When    enforcement  is  costly  –  as  is  the  case  in  countries  under  analysis  -  opportunistic 
behavior may lead to hold-ups if one of the agents has an attractive alternative to contract 
compliance (cfr. Williamson, 1981).  To understand under which conditions contracting will 
be sustainable, we consider the extreme situation where there is no external enforcement – 
which is equivalent to assuming that external enforcement is prohibitively costly. 
First, the farmer can divert the received inputs to other uses, such as selling them or 
applying them to other production activities (e.g. subsistence crops). This way, he can always 
at least earn an income Yd = αph – C + I – φ
f, where αph – C represents the farmer’s income 
from producing the low value product. The revenue from reselling the specific inputs equals I. 
If he violates a contract, the farmer suffers a reputation cost φ
f.
18 If held up in this way, the 
buyer earns a payoff Пd = - I (assuming that he cannot find alternative suppliers ex post). 
                                                 
16 λ > 0 is increasing in transaction costs to deal with other suppliers (e.g. search costs, switching costs, transport 
costs, costs of training…), decreasing in the degree supplier concentration, increasing in the degree of buyer 
concentration (e.g. Inderst & Mazzarotto 2008).  To ensure that θ is non-negative, we assume that α + λ ≤ 1. 
17 Nash (1953) proposes that the sharing rule be ½, but we prefer to take a more general view. 
18 This can be interpreted in a broad sense not only as a pure loss in terms of reputation, but also as a social 
capital cost, a moral loss, or the loss of future trade opportunities.    16
An alternative way to hold up the buyer, is when the farmer applies the inputs to the 
crops, as agreed in the contract, but then sells the high value output to an alternative buyer 
who offers a higher price because he does not need to account for the cost of the provided 
inputs. However, the competing buyer may not value the product as much as the contract 
buyer who outlined the production process from the start according to his specific needs. To 
account for this, we define γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) as the share of the price offered by  competing 
buyers.
19 The farmer’s payoff under holdup of the buyer is in this case Ys= γph – C – φ
f, the 
buyer’s payoff is Пs = - I. 
For the farmer to voluntarily comply with the contract, his income from the contract Y 
must at least be as much as his outside option, obtained from breaching the contract, i.e. his 
incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied.
20 
  The contract (Y, П) that satisfies these constraints can then be written as:  
Y = αph – C + max [β(θ – I – t), I – φ
f, (γ – α) ph – φ
f)]         (8) 
П = ph –  m – I – C – t – Y                 (9) 
It follows that, if the contract is enforced, the supplier’s income will be increasing in his ex 
ante as well as his ex post outside options, while decreasing in the buyer’s ex ante outside 
option.
21 However, contracts will only be enforced for a specified range of parameter values. 
The conditions for contract feasibility are summarized in the following restriction on θ:  
θ ≥ θmin = max (I + t, 2I + t – φ
f, I + t + (γ – α) ph – φ
f)        (10) 
This condition captures several reasons for potential contract failure.  If θ is smaller 
than I + t, the net surplus of the transaction will be negative and there is no incentive for 
contract formation.  This can be due to two reasons. If θ < I, there is no surplus to be created. 
We refer to this situation as “efficient separation”.  If I < θ < I + t, there would be a surplus 
                                                 
19 γ reflects the degree of buyer-specificity of the production standards (the higher the specificity of the product 
or the quality standards, or the higher the transaction costs of switching, the lower γ  is). If quality characteristics 
are more observable (or cheaper to observe), then γ will increase.   
20 The relevant incentive compatibility constraints are Y ≥ Yd (ICC
f1) and Y ≥ Ys  (ICC
f2).     
21 For a theoretical discussion of opportunistic behaviour by the buyer, see Swinnen & Vandeplas (2007).   17
under non-distorted conditions, but either taxation or inefficiencies in the chain prevent an 
effective surplus; we refer to this situation as “distorted separation”.  If θ ≥ I + t but smaller 
than 2I + t – φ
f, or than I + t + (γ – α) ph – φ
f, there is no price the buyer can offer to the 
supplier in order to make him comply with the contract. In other words, the premium that the 
buyer  has  to  pay  the  supplier  not  to  breach  the  contract  is  larger  than  the  buyer’s  gross 
revenues: he cannot afford this.  Under these conditions, the contract will not be realized, 
even if it would be socially efficient to do so. This is referred to as “inefficient separation”. 
Condition (8) implies that several factors are crucial for contracting to be sustainable.  
First, the relative value in the chain (θ) needs to be sufficiently high to realize a net surplus 
and  to  overcome  enforcement  problems.  From  (7)  it  follows  that θ  will  higher  when  the 
consumer price (ph) is higher, when processing and marketing costs (m) are lower, and when 
there are less alternatives for suppliers and buyers (α and λ low). Second, a higher investment 
cost (I) reduces contract feasibility. The variable I is present in each of the three conditions on 
θ which are summarized in equation (8): the higher the input cost the higher the consumer 
price needs to be to create a surplus, and the higher the chance of contract breach by the 
supplier. 
Third, government taxes or subsidies (tx) will affect contracting.  The conditions for 
contract enforcement will be more restrictive (i.e. a higher θ will be required for contract 
formation) the higher the government tax on farmers (tx > 0), and less restrictive with the 
government subsidizing the farmers (tx < 0). Fourth, excess processing and marketing costs 
(tm) have a similar effect on contracting. Contracts can be enforced at lower values of θ if 
excess processing and marketing costs are lower.  Fifth, the degree of buyer specificity (γ) 
also affects contract feasibility. If there are no alternative outlets for the high-value product, 
hence if buyer specificity of the product is high (low γ), contracts are sustainable for a wider   18
range of θ, as θmin will be lower. Finally, a higher reputation cost of the farmer (φ
f) makes 
contract breach less likely.  
In summary, if the relative value in the chain (θ) is sufficiently high, opportunistic 
behavior can be overcome by paying a higher price to the supplier. Inefficient separation is 
thus more likely to occur (a) if the value θ is low, (b) if the value of required inputs I is high, 
(c) if farm reputation costs φ
f  are low, and (d) if there are alternative sales outlets for high 
value products (i.e. γ is high). 
Figure 6 illustrates these various separation effects.  For illustrative purposes we use 
specific numerical values for some of the parameters: φ
f = I, m = 0, β = 0.5 and tx = tm = 0.5 
I.
22 The figure shows how the gains in farmers’ income (∆Y = Y – Yl) and in processors’ 
income (∆П = П – Пl) change with the value of the commodity θ. The line S* represents the 
surplus that could be created without distortions (t = 0) and with perfect enforcement.  Line St 
represents surplus with distortions (St=S* – t), and the kink in the St function reflects the hold-
up effect. In the illustrated case with the specific numerical values, contracting and surplus 
creation will only occur if θ ≥ 3I. Efficient separation occurs for θ < I; distortion-induced 
separation occurs for I < θ < 2I; and contracts are not possible due to inefficient separation 
when 2I ≤ θ < 3I.
23  If θ > 3I contracting is feasible. However, note that within the interval   
3I ≤ θ < 4I, the processor has to pay the farmer a premium in order to prevent the farmer from 
breaching  the  contract.  We  have  defined  this  an  “efficiency  premium”  (Swinnen  and 
Vandeplas, 2007), similar to the concept of an efficiency wage (Salop, 1979).  This results in 
the farmer’s share of the surplus (∆Y) being larger than βS, as is shown by the dotted line in 
                                                 
22 Note that these parameter assumptions do not affect our main conclusions. 
23 Another way to enforce contracts is by investing in supervision (or by engaging third party enforcement), if it 
is not prohibitively costly. Less inefficient separation will then occur, but the total contract surplus will be 
reduced. With M, the cost of supervision, the surplus is S(M)=θ – I – t – M. If (1-β) S(M)> ∆П as defined above, 
the  buyer  will  effectively  invest  in  supervision.  See  Minten  et  al.  (2009)  for  an  example  of  an  extensive 
supervision and monitoring system. Alternatively, when the most probable destination of delivered inputs is the 
non-contract,  subsistence crops, buyers have tried to address input diversion incentives by offering  farmers 
additional inputs as fertilizers and pesticides for their own food crops (e.g. Govereh et al. 1999).   19
Figure 6.  If θ ≥ 4I, contracting is feasible with the β share rule as both partners’ incentive 
compatibility constraints are satisfied.  
 
3.3. Liberalization 
It is clear from the analysis above that the conditions for contract enforcement under state 
control  differ  considerably  from  those  under  a  market  system.  Monopolistic  state  control 
made contract enforcement more likely, because of the absence of competition (hence low α 
as well as low γ).  Monopoly control also implied high reputation costs for farmers (hence 
high φ
f).
24  Excess marketing costs tm > 0 made enforcement more difficult, while the impact 
of price distortions depend on the nature of the distortions: subsidization of farmers in the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (tx > 0) made enforcement easier, while taxation of farmers 
such as in Africa and China (tx < 0) made enforcement more difficult. 
We  now  analyze  the  impact  of  liberalization.  We  focus  on  two  crucial,  and 
interrelated, aspects of the liberalization process reform. One is the liberalization of prices 
meaning that the government no longer sets prices; the other is the liberalization of markets, 
i.e.  the  removal  of  control  over  the  structure  of  the  commodity  chains  by  allowing 
competition in the chain and no longer dictating trade (internally and externally).
25  
Define  T  as  the  governments’  “price  policy”  and  C  as  the  governments’  “market 
policy”. Liberalization of prices is represented by ∆T > 0 with ∂tx/∂T > 0 for tx < 0 and   
∂tx/∂T < 0 for tx > 0.  Market liberalization is represented by ∆Z > 0.  
 
 
                                                 
24 An alternative argument is that centrally imposed conditions to source from all farmers (for political 
objectives) may actually result in lower reputation costs under state organization.   
25 We do not discuss separately the effect of privatization. Its effects are implicit in our model. If privatization 
leads to more efficient management, and hence to a reduction in excess marketing costs (tm), this will lead to an 
increase in farm prices, with similar effects as a decrease in tax policies. This effect should lead to an increase in 
output  and  in  farm  incomes.  However,  privatization  may  not  lead  to  such  reduction  if  it  induces 
monopolistic/monopsonistic pricing. The key element is competition, which we analyze explicitly.     20
Liberalization of prices  
The liberalization of prices (including cut of taxes and/or subsidies) will affect the profits of 
farms directly by its effect on the output prices, but also indirectly through its impact on the 
contracting conditions. Equation (10) implies that ∂θmin/∂tx > 0. Hence, the effects depend on 
the nature of the distortions.  
First, when farmers were taxed under the pre-reform conditions, it follows that price 
liberalization will improve contract feasibility by reducing θmin. As a result, the domain over 
which there is “distorted separation” will become smaller, and contracting will be possible 
over a larger domain of θ.  The impact on farm income is positive for the domain over which 
contracting  is  possible  after  liberalization,  but  will  not  change  for  the  domain  where 
contracting is not possible.  This follows from equation (8): ∂Y/∂tx < 0 when tx  is a binding 
condition for Y, and ∂Y/∂tx = 0 otherwise.  One should therefore expect output to increase for 
the production activities where contracting is possible ex post.  
Second, when price liberalization implies a cut of subsidies to agriculture, the farmer’s 
surplus will fall, either because he receives less for his production or because production will 
no longer be possible as contracting will no longer be feasible reduced subsidies.  Hence, in 
this case both factors will reinforce each other in inducing output decline.    
 
Liberalization of markets 
The  second  element  of  the  liberalization  policy  was  market  liberalization  (∆Z  >  0),  i.e. 
reducing inefficiencies by stimulating private competition. This was done by allowing private 
traders and buyers to enter the market and/or by privatizing and/or removing the monopoly 
status of the state companies in the agri-food chain and to allow them to compete.  If one only 
considers effects in the output market, one would expect competition to further increase the 
farmer’s  outside  options  (through  α  and  γ)  and  increase  his  share  of  the  contract  value.   21
However, market liberalization also affects contracting. With (increased) competition between 
buyers, contracting may break down although it would be socially efficient. Using our model, 
we identify several effects of competition, both ex post and ex ante.  
First, the introduction of competition between private buyers will increase the ex ante 
outside option farmers face at the time of contract negotiation. In our model, this implies an 
increase in α (∂α/∂Z > 0). 
The second effect of competition is on company management. There is an extensive 
literature  on  how  competition  (and  privatization)  changed  manager  and  firm  behavior  in 
transition countries (Roland, 2000; Konings and Walsh, 1999). The manager’s incentive for 
innovation and profit maximization will be stronger in a competitive environment. This effect 
is  reinforced  when  there  is  no  longer  a  soft  budget  constraint  as  there  usually  was  for 
government-managed  state  boards.  Improved  management  reduces  excess  processing  and 
marketing costs tm (∂tm/∂Z < 0). 
  Third, competition between buyers will reduce the farmer’s reputation cost φ
f from 
breach of contract (∂φ
f/∂Z < 0). The number of agents operating in the market is expected to 
negatively affect the penalty for contract breach (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998), because the threat 
of  cut-off  from  future  contract  arrangements  is  less  stringent,  as  there  are  other  contract 
partners available. This argument is in line with Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), who state that 
reputation is an effective weapon against moral hazard only for suppliers “of those factors that 
are in excess supply”. In other words, a higher demand for the supplier’s produce lowers his 
reputation cost from breaching a contract. 
A  second  reason  why  the  penalty  for  breaching  a  contract  is  lower  with  more 
competition, is that reputation effects are less prevalent in a competitive market, where agents 
are less likely to coordinate and share information (see also Zanardi 2004). This will make it 
easier for an opportunistic supplier to find an alternative buyer.  Local information networks   22
work less well when the number of agents expands, as it costs more in terms of effort, money, 
and/or time to let information spread among a larger group of agents. 
  Fourth, market liberalization may as well give rise to an increased ex post outside 
option of the farmer through a higher number of opportunistic buyers, i.e. an increased γ 
(∂γ/∂Z > 0). With more buyers, it will be harder to behave monopsonistically, or to collude. 
Moreover,  more  buyers  may  bring  a  wider  diversity  of  buyers,  including  buyers  who 
potentially have a higher valuation of the high quality good. 
  The impact of market liberalization on contract feasibility and on farm incomes can 
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where ∂Y/∂tm ≤ 0, ∂Y/∂φ
f
 ≤ 0, ∂Y/∂γ ≥ 0, ∂θ/∂α  < 0, ∂θmin/∂α  ≤ 0, ∂θmin/∂tm  ≥ 0, ∂θmin/∂φ
f
  ≤ 0, 
∂θmin/∂γ  ≥ 0, ∂Y/∂α  ≥ 0 (in each case the effect is zero when the constraint is not binding and 
either positive or negative when the constraint is binding).  From equation (11) it follows that 
market liberalization will generally induce an increase in farm surplus from production and 
thus an increase in supply (as it was intended to), since all terms of the formula are positive. 
However, this will only be the case if contracting is feasible. From equation (12) it follows 
that  market  liberalization  implies  several  sub-effects  which  will  make  contracting  less 
feasible. To assess the effect of α on contract enforcement, we have to both consider the 
impact of α on θ and on θmin. The first term of (12) will be zero if α is binding on θmin; 
otherwise it will be negative.  In fact, three of the four effects on the right hand side of 
equation  (12)  are  negative,
26  implying  a  negative  effect  on  contract  feasibility.  Only  the 
                                                 
26  More  specifically,  each  of  the  terms  is  strictly  negative  or  zero  depending  on  whether  the  respective 
constraints are binding or not.   23
improvement  in  excess  processing  and  marketing  costs  (term  2)  will  improve  contract 
feasibility,  ceteris  paribus.  While  the  net  effect  depends  on  the  size  of  the  different 
components, and is an empirical question, the theoretical results do suggest that important 
constraints on output growth with market liberalization may be expected if one takes into 
account the endogenous impact on the emergence and enforcement of contracting. 
 
3.4. Implications  
These theoretical results have major implications for liberalization policies and their expected 
effects. Our findings predict that liberalization will not just affect farmer prices directly but 
also the institutional organization of the commodity chain. The latter, in turn, will have a 
major impact on farm incomes and supply responses.   
The  analysis  has  major  implications  for  reform  effects.  In  particular,  price  and 
competition  reforms  will  have  direct  and  indirect  effects  on  both  efficiency  (output  and 
productivity)  and  equity  (the  distribution  of  rents  between  buyer  and  farm).  In  terms  of 
efficiency effects (the main focus of this paper), the theory predicts that price increases would 
improve incentives to produce (direct effect) and improve the provision of inputs as private 
enforcement would be possible (indirect effect); and vice versa for price decreases. Hence the 
direct and indirect effects are reinforcing each other, either positively or negatively. With 
competition the direct and indirect effect may have opposite effects. Increased competition 
will directly stimulate output by improving benefits for farmers but may indirectly constrain 
or  reduce  growth  by  making  enforcement  more  difficult.  Hence  the  two  effects  may  be 
opposite, but this depends on the nature of the commodity and the supply chain. To illustrate 
this  further,  consider  three  types  of  commodities:  low  value  products  which  require  no 
external inputs; medium value which require external inputs; and high value products which 
require external inputs.  The first type of commodity will not face problems of enforcing 
interlinked  contracting  since  there  is  no  interlinked  contracting.    If  initially  there  is  no   24
interlinked  input  supply,  then  there  will  only  be  direct  effects  of  price  and  competition 
reforms.  Regarding the second and third type of commodity, the theory predicts that vertical 
coordination/interlinked contracting by the private sector would be more easy to sustain in 
higher value commodity chains. Therefore, for commodities which require substantive inputs, 
we would expect the supply response to be positively related to the commodity value because 
of the vertical coordination that will (not) emerge due to private sector investment.  
 
3.5. Other Reforms 
Before moving to the interpretation of the empirical facts with our model, we should point at 
some limitations of our theory and mention some additional reform aspects which we have 
not included in our derivations.  Two reforms which are closely related to the model are the 
liberalization of the capital markets and of trade and investment regimes.  Another important 
reform in some countries were property rights reforms.  
The cost of capital in developing and transition countries is typically high, and capital 
constraints are  especially  important for (small) farmers.  Liberalization may reduce capital 
constraints by inducing competition in the capital market (e.g. Henry, 2003). However, this 
effect  is  conditional  on  the  (change  in)  profitability  of  the  farm  sector  and  changes  in 
subsidies in the capital market. For example in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
access to capital collapsed and the cost of capital increased strongly during the transition 
period (Swinnen and Gow, 1999).   
Another factor is the impact of liberalization on foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
its spillovers.  There is substantial evidence that market liberalization (and the liberalization 
of  the  investment  regimes)  has  induced  an  increase  in  FDI.  FDI  inflows,  in  turn,  have 
stimulated  contracting  as  foreign  companies  have  lower  capital  costs  or  face  less  capital 
constraints, so that FDI leads to a decreased capital cost and increased contracting in host   25
countries (e.g. Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Girma et al., 2008; Gow et al. 2001; Harrisson and 
Macmillan, 2003; Héricourt and Poncet 2009).
27  
Finally, as we already pointed out earlier, privatization of property rights at the farm 
level was very important in some countries which we cover, in particular in Asia (China and 
Vietnam) and in Eastern Europe, and less so in other countries, in particular in Africa.  
In the interpretation of the empirical observations we will complement the hypotheses 
based  on  our  theoretical model  with these  other reform  effects  where  we  think  these  are 
essential to understand the overall reform effects and economic performances. 
 
4.  Explaining the differences in reform effects 
The  analysis  in  Section  3  implies  that  different  reform  strategies  or  the  same  reforms  in 
countries with different initial conditions may have different results, not just because of the 
direct effects on prices or firms, but also because of their impact on the governance of the 
supply chains.  It is therefore important to consider countries’ differences in terms of the 
choice of reform policies and in their initial conditions (initial price distortions and income).  
Table 1 summarizes these differences by region.  
 
4.1. Initial conditions 
Initial condition 1: price distortions 
As already explained, important price distortions were present everywhere, but the nature of 
the distortions differed strongly across countries.  Farmers were generally taxed (directly or 
indirectly) in Africa (Anderson and Masters, 2008; Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1991) and in 
China  and  Vietnam  (Rozelle  and  Swinnen,  2004)  while  they  received  (often  indirect) 
subsidies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008).   
                                                 
27 In many developing countries, however, the foreign companies’ lead over domestic companies is reduced by 
domestic policies restricting FDI and hereby favouring local companies.   26
Figure 7 presents indicators of government assistance to farmers which shows that farmers in 
CEE and FSU were highly subsidized prior to the reforms with producer support estimates 
(PSE) varying from 40% to 80%. In China and SSA, nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) to 
farmers were strongly negative: on average around -30% in SSA and lower than -50% in 
China.
28   
 
Initial condition 2: income (average commodity value) 
There are also major differences between the regions in terms of income at the start of the 
reforms (Table 1). Incomes where much higher in CEE (10,069 $) and, to a lesser extent, in 
FSU (4,364 $) than in China (674 $) and in SSA (1,429 $). These income differences are 
correlated with the average value in the agri-food chains. The value of agricultural production 
is usually much higher in countries with higher incomes and development levels. The value in 
food supply chains increases as both quality and safety demands and the level of processing 
increase  with  increasing  income  levels  With  rising  incomes  consumers  change  their 
preferences away from basic staple food commodities towards higher value food items such 
as  fruit,  vegetables,  fish  and  animal  products.  If  we  look  at  the  structure  of  the  total 
agricultural output at the time of reform we can observe significant differences across the 
regions (Figure 8).  In CEE and FSU countries, on average more than 70% of agriculture 
production consisted of higher value food products such as fruits, vegetables, milk and meat 
products; for SSA and EA this was less than 50%. Moreover, in SSA and EA on average 10 to 
20% of agricultural production was in very low value staple crops such as roots, tubers and 
pulses.  
                                                 
28  We  use  two  measures  because  of  data  availability.  The  PSE  and  NRA  measures  use  different  ways  of 
calculation but are comparable as general indicators of government support to agriculture. PSE % measures how 
much of gross farm income is due to government measures. The NRA measures the distortions in farm prices 
and revenues due to government interventions (see OECD (2008) and Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) for 
details).   27
Industrial crops – typically coffee, cocoa, tea, cotton, rubber, and tobacco with an 
intermediate value – were more important in SSA than in Europe and Asia.  These products 
had an intermediate value because they were mostly produced for exports to higher income 
(western) countries. 
 
Initial condition 3: collective farming system 
While in China, Vietnam, the FSU and CEE the pre-reform situation was characterized by a 
collective farming-system, this was not the case in SSA. Although in most SSA there were 
(and still are) no individual private property rights over land, agricultural cultivation was not 
communal but based on private land user rights.
29  
 
4.2. Reform choices 
While  prices  were  liberalized,  private  traders  were  allowed  in  agricultural  trade,  and  the 
monopoly status of government marketing boards and parastatal processing companies was 
removed, in general, the timing and extent of the various reform elements differed among 
countries. 
The main reform approach in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union was a 
“big-bang” approach. This implied the simultaneous liberalization of prices and trade and the 
introduction of competition and privatization across the economy.
30    
In contrast, China sequenced various components of the reform package. China first 
reformed property rights in agriculture and later administratively increased prices to reduce 
taxation on farmers. Only afterwards, it gradually allowed competition in food markets. The 
gradual approach to the reforms in China differed also from those in the CEE and the Soviet 
                                                 
29 The exception in SSA is Ethiopia which has known a China-style communal agricultural production system 
from 1975 to 1987. 
30 Within this large set of countries, there was still considerable variation. See Rozelle and Swinnen (2004) for 
details.   28
Union, because China reduced its control over farm prices while maintaining state control 
over the institutions that supplied inputs to and purchased outputs (mostly rice) from the 
farms (Rozelle, 1996; Sicular, 1988; 1995).
31    
In Sub Saharan Africa, reform strategies were a mixture (Kherralah et al., 2002; World 
Bank, 1994; Akiyama et al., 2003). In most countries, the removal of state control was not as 
sequenced as in China. A big bang reform approach was launched in some countries such as 
Nigeria in 1987 with simultaneous removal of price controls, trade restrictions and (para-) 
state crop procurement and input provision. In many other SSA countries, reforms started at 
different  times  in  different  agricultural  sub-sectors.
32  In  most  countries  reforms  started  in 
basic  food  sectors  while  in  export  sectors  –  such  as  coffee,  cocoa,  cotton  etc.  –  reform 
processes started later. In addition, basic food sectors were often completely liberalized while 
in many export sectors state control was not removed completely.  State monopolies still 
exists in some sectors – most notably in the cotton sector in Western Africa.
33 However, in 
some specific cases, a sequential approach was used, similar to the one described for China, 
with first liberalization of prices and subsequently gradual removal of the state monopoly. 
This was for example the case in the coffee sector in Cameroon and Tanzania, the cocoa 
sector in Cameroon and the cotton sector in Eastern Africa. However, in some cases, such as 
the coffee sector in Uganda, the reversed sequencing was used, with first the introduction of 
competition and later on the removal of direct taxes. In summary, reform strategies were a 
mixture in SSA. 
                                                 
31  The policy evolution is actually more nuanced than “the gradual process” as it is usually summarized. In fact 
the Chinese government initially retracted from an early policy of allowing competition and re-introduced state 
control  after  competition  created  (implicit)  contract  break-downs  and  the  vertically  coordinated  supply  of 
fertilizer to the farms. In fact, China’s initial approach was not that different from that in East Europe (and the 
Soviet Union) as it liberalized markets and allowed private traders to come in. However, the resulting turmoil on 
the market and the threat of reduced rice supplies for the cities induced the Chinese leaders to re-take control 
over the supply chains. See Rozelle (1996) for a fascinating review of these policy changes and their effects.  
32 For example in Tanzania, reforms started for the coffee sector in 1990, for the cashew nut sector in 1991 and 
for the cotton sector in 1994. 
33 See Akiyama et al. (2003) for an overview of reforms in cocoa, coffee, cotton and sugar sectors in SSA 
countries.    29
While  the  reform  choices  differed  in  the  three  regions,  in  particular  regarding  the 
combination and timing of policies, it is worth emphasizing that in all three regions the share 
of the private sector increased strongly over the past two decades and much of the price 
distortions were removed. The latter is clear from Figure 7, which shows how for all regions, 
the indicators (PSE and NRA) have moved towards low levels (with zero representing the 
absence of government support/taxation).   
 
4.3. An explanation of different liberalization performances 
We now combine the insights from our model and from the analysis of differences in initial 




In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where farmers were subsidized under the 
state  controlled  system,  the  liberalization  of  prices  caused  a  dramatic  reduction  in  farm 
support  and  strong  decline  in  the  terms  of  trade  for  farmers,  i.e.  farmers’  output  prices 
declined strongly in real terms and compared to input prices.  At the same time, farms and the 
food  and  agribusiness  industry  were  privatized  and  state  directives  were  removed.  This 
combination caused a complete collapse of the state controlled vertical coordination system 
and with it, the provision of inputs to farmers. Along with the removal of subsidies, this 
collapse  has  caused  an  initial  sharp  decline  in  agricultural  output  and  productivity,  as  is 
reflected in the performance indicators in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
The initial output and productivity decline was reinforced by the fact that the CEE and 
FSU farms were relatively capital and (external) input intensive, which made them strongly 
dependent on exchange with suppliers for their inputs. In addition, where large collective   30
farms collapsed, gains from improved incentives in smaller family farms were initially more 
than offset by losses in scale economies.
34 
However, the dramatic reforms in a region with relatively high incomes also induced 
large  inflows  of  foreign  investments,  much  of  which  went  into  the  food  industry  and 
agribusiness  (see  Figure  9).    These  investments,  in  turn,  induced  a  rapid  expansion  of 
privately  organized  vertical  coordination  through  the  private  agri-food  sector  with  major 
spillovers on the farms (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Dries and Swinnen, 2004; World Bank, 
2005). In combination with the stabilization of real prices in the mid 1990s, these investments 
caused a flow of inputs, capital, and technology to the farm sector – as explained by our 
model – and contributed to strong increases in productivity in Eastern Europe.   
Within  the  European  transition  region  the  intensity  and  speed  of  this  process  was 
related  with  income,  which  can  be  interpreted  as  being  correlated  with  the  value  in  the 
commodity chains (which corresponds to θ in our theoretical model).  The process started 
earliest and most intensive in the richer countries of Central Europe, and later and slower in 
poorer transition further East and South (Swinnen, 2002; 2007).  Figure 9 documents the 
inflow of FDI in the regions, and clearly shows how FDI growth was much stronger and 
earlier in CEE than in FSU or the other regions. Dries et al. (2009) show how the growth of 
contracting in supply chains is strongly correlated with income – which creates a market for 
higher value FDI products and thus (endogenous) enforcement of higher value contracts – and 
progress in reforms – which enhances macro-economic stability and enforcement of contracts 




                                                 
34 See Macours and Swinnen (2000) for estimations of the contributions of the various reform elements to the 
decline in CEE agricultural output.    31
China 
In China, the initial growth came from the property rights reforms – giving land to the rural 
households. This caused a strong growth in productivity and output during the first 5 years of 
transition. In contrast to the CEE and FSU farms, Chinese farms were very labor intensive, 
with very little input from outside, and hence benefited strongly from the enhanced labor 
intensive effects without any losses of scale economies. These productivity gains (which are 
not captured by our formal model) explained much of the gains during the first five years of 
the reforms. 
In a second phase, the Chinese rulers gradually adjusted prices towards market price 
levels,  thereby  reducing  taxation,  which  benefited  farms.  In  addition,  there  were  no 
disruptions  in  exchange since  the  government  remained  firmly  in  control  of  the  agencies 
buying commodities and providing inputs. In line with the analytically derived results in the 
model, this reduction and removal of agricultural taxes combined with the initial retaining of 
state monopolies and state-controlled interlinking and input provision caused a sharp positive 
supply response.   
The subsequent gradual introduction of competition in the food chain (by allowing 
traders’ competition at the margin) removed inefficiencies and improved farmers’ bargaining 
power and income in the chains without leading to contract breaches and input and lead to a 
further positive supply response.  
In  summary,  the  success  of  China’s  reform  is  due  to  a  combination  of  initial 
conditions (labor intensive and low input farming) and carefully sequenced reforms, which all 




                                                 
35  See  Lin  (1992)  and  deBrauw,  Huang  and  Rozelle  (2000,  2004)  for  detailed  estimates  of  the  growth 
contributions of the various reform components.   32
Africa 
Regarding the SSA reform performance, we offer a set of hypotheses to explain (a) why SSA 
growth is lower than that of China (and Vietnam); (b) why SSA growth was higher than that 
of CEE and FSU in the initial reform years; and (c) why growth in SSA was slower than in 
CEE (and FSU) after the initial stage. 
(a) SSA growth, on aggregate, was slower than in China for three reasons. First, it did not 
benefit  from  an  initial  boost  provided  by  property  rights  reform  within  a  labor  intensive 
farming  system.  Such  reform  was  generally  absent  in  Africa  since  farming  was  never 
collectivized.  
A  second  reason  why  growth  was  slower  is  because  there  were  more  market 
disruptions with the liberalizations in SSA than in China. SSA reform strategies included 
privatization and the rather abrupt removal of state monopolies at the same time as price 
liberalization.  The introduction of competition in the chains led to break-down in some of the 
supply chains, reducing access to inputs for farmers in these sectors and impeding output and 
productivity growth. 
A third reason for the slower aggregate growth in SSA is that the average reduction in 
farm taxation was considerably less in SSA than in China. As Figure 7 shows, in the fifteen 
years after the start of the reforms, the NRA increased from less than -50% to above zero in 
China – an increase of approximately 60 NRA points, while the tax reduction in SSA was 
considerably less: from around -30% to around -10%, representing an improvement of 20 
NRA points, which is only one third of that in China. 
(b) There are also three reasons why SSA growth was initially stronger than that of the 
European  transition  countries.  First,  SSA  did  not  experience  a  decline  in  output  and 
productivity  with  the  privatization  of  large  farms  in  a  capital  (or  land)  intensive  farming 
system  because  such  privatization  did  not  take  place.  Second,  price  incentives  for  SSA   33
farmers improved with liberalization, while they worsened in CEE and FSU, as is illustrated 
by  Figure 7. Third, on  average, the supply chain disruptions were less  important in SSA 
because a smaller share of the SSA production was dependent on externally provided inputs 
than in the more advanced and more industrialized economic systems of CEE and FSU. A 
substantial share of SSA production, in particular staple food production, did not rely on such 
formal input (and output) markets, and hence suffered less from the disruptions. 
(c) The latter factors also play a role in explaining why after a few years in CEE (and later 
in FSU) the decline halts and growth resumes at a faster pace than in SSA. When the initial 
disruptions  of  farm  privatization  and  the  one-off  output  fall  with  the  subsidy  cuts  was 
absorbed in CEE, growth in the CEE supply chains was stimulated by the massive inflow of 
investment, often FDI, in agribusiness and the food industry, with strong spillover effects on 
the farms through vertical coordination. These effects have emerged much slower and much 
less extensively in poorer countries with more macro-economic (and institutional) instability. 
This applies to the slower recovery in the FSU compared to CEE, and even more so to SSA. 
Unlike in CEE, private vertical coordination did not take over (or not to the same extent) after 
the collapse of state-controlled supply chains as FDI and private investment in the early years 
after reforms was much more limited in SSA (see Figure 9). In addition to other factors (lack 
of infrastructure, political and economic instability), the low incomes and the general low 
value  in  SSA  food  chains  have  constrained  the  emergence  of  private  sector  vertical 
coordination and market interlinking, and thereby growth in the entire chain.  
 
Variations in commodity sector performance in Africa 
To further document and support these arguments, we disaggregate the average growth in 
SSA into three subgroups: “staple food crops” (including cereals, roots, tubers, and pulses), 
“industrial crops” (including coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, oil crops and tobacco), and “fruits and   34
vegetables (F&V)”. While these groups also include a mix of different products, we should 
expect different performances according to our model. 
We expect the first group to be less susceptible to market disruptions as it was less 
dependent on external inputs. The second group represents mostly commodities produced for 
export  which  were  strongly  dependent  on  interlinked  input  arrangements.  The  last  group 
includes both low value F&V for the domestic market, for which the main input is labor, and 
high value F&V for exports, which require major external inputs. 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the relative performance of these groups. Staple food 
crops and F&V crops have experienced a significant output increase while the industrial crops 
(intermediate-value) performed much below average. After a decade of reform, the output of 
staple food crops and fruits and vegetables was 50 to 60% higher than the initial pre-reform 
level. For industrial crops – including coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, tobacco and oil crops – this 
is only about 35%.  
The  lack  of  output  growth  for  traditional  export  commodities  in  SSA  is  often 
attributed to decreasing world prices for these commodities. Indeed, during the 1980s – when 
most  SSA  countries  embarked  on  economic  and  agricultural  reforms  –  prices  for  these 
commodities deteriorated sharply. However, according to a World Bank study (World Bank, 
1994) real producer prices for export crops went up during the 1980s in some SSA countries 
because the effect of price liberalization offset the effect of decreasing world market prices.  
Also  labor  productivity  indicators  reveal  the  same  patterns  across  commodities. 
Staples  and  F&V  have  the  highest  productivity  increases  and  labor  productivity  in  the 
industrial crops was essentially stagnant during the decade after the start of the reforms. It is 
this sector which reduced average growth in SSA agriculture. 
These performance variations among sectors are consistent with our model – and thus 
add  support  to  our  general  hypotheses  on  the  post-reform  performance.  The  output  and   35
productivity increases in the staple food crop sector were better than the SSA average, albeit 
still lower than China and second stage CEE (compare with Figure 2 and Figure 3). In the 
SSA  staple  food  sector  the  simultaneous  liberalization  of  prices  and  introduction  of 
competition – and with it the collapse of state-organized public vertical coordination and 
input provision – did not result in major output and productivity declines. Input requirements 
in this sector are generally low and therefore output growth has not been very dependent on 
vertical  coordination.  Instead,  the  sector  benefited  from  liberalized  prices  and  enhanced 
competition on spot markets. However, growth was also limited after the reforms, as new 
forms of private vertical coordination and market interlinking did not occur in this sector 
because the value in the staple food chains is generally too low to sustain private interlinking. 
Marketing activities in this sector have been taken over by a large amount of small private 
traders and are based on spot market transactions.        
In contrast, in the SSA industrial crop sectors – including many traditional agricultural 
exports - the simultaneous removal of price controls, introduction of competition and the 
associated collapse in state-controlled vertical coordination have caused major disruptions in 
input  provisions  to  farmers  and  lead  to  stagnating  output  and  productivity  growth.  Input 
requirements for the production of traditional export commodities are generally much higher 
than  in  the  staple  food  crop  sector  and  therefore  the  collapse  of  public  input  provisions 
affected output and productivity much more – as in the CEE. Unlike in the CEE however, 
massive private investments with private sector vertical coordination and input provision have 
not occurred in the first two decades of reform in the SSA industrial crops sector, leading to 
continued stagnation.  
The highest output and productivity growth in SSA was in the fruit and vegetable 
sector: slightly higher than the growth in staple foods and much higher than in the traditional 
export commodity sectors. Our model suggests that this sector may have grown because of   36
two, quite different, mechanisms. First, low value F&V production for the local market was 
mostly depending on labor input and benefited thus from the same effects as the staple crops. 
Second, an important – and increasing – part of the growth has come from high value fruit 
and vegetable chains for exports. This sector has grown very rapidly after the reforms, as 
illustrated in Figure 13 and Figure 14. The high value in these chains has sustained post-
reform private investments in this sector and the occurrence of private vertical coordination 
with quality upgrading, market interlinking and input provision to farmers. A series of recent 
studies show how the vertical coordination mechanisms and their spillovers and productivity 
growth effects are similar to the growth mechanisms in CEE (e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009; Minten et al., 2009).  
  In summary, the very different experiences of these three subsectors in SSA – which 
are “hidden” by the average growth rates are consistent with our general arguments that the 
reliance on external inputs and the value in the supply chains, which affect the endogenous 
emergence of exchange institutions in a liberalized environment, are crucially important to 
understand the performance in SSA, both in itself - and in a comparative perspective. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
This paper has documented the reform performance of African countries and compared it with 
that of reforms in countries in Asia and Europe.  Post-reform growth in SSA was lower than 
in East Asia, but initially stronger than in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, after 
five  (CEE)  and  ten  (FSU)  years  of  transition,  growth  in  Europe  and  Central  Asia  has 
surpassed that in SSA. Within SSA, growth has been relatively strong in staple foods and in 
F&V, while stagnant in industrial crops.  
To  explain  these  relative  performances,  we  have  developed  a  model  to  formally 
analyze  how  liberalization  affects  production  and  income  distribution  with  a  model  that   37
explicitly integrates the impact of liberalization on the institutions that govern production and 
exchange in developing and transition countries.  Specifically our model integrates that in the 
pre-reform system, inputs were often provided to farmers through interlinked contracts by 
monopolistic  and  state-controlled  organizations;  and  the  reform-induced  changes  in 
institutions that govern contract enforcement.  Our analysis shows how these institutional 
characteristics have been affected by the liberalization process.  Using the model, we derive 
hypotheses on how these characteristics affect the supply response to the liberalization, and, 
consequently, on how to explain the poor performance of some countries after liberalization.  
In the last part of the paper, we use these hypotheses to relate initial conditions and 
reform choices to performances. We offer a series of hypotheses to explain differences among 
commodities, and to explain that  the supply effects and the governance of exchange in the 
post-liberalization economy differ also between commodities; and more particularly that there 
is a positive correlation between supply response, vertically coordinated market organization, 
and the value in the chain.   
In particular, regarding the SSA reform performance, we offer several hypotheses to 
explain (a) why SSA growth is lower than that of China (and Vietnam); (b) why SSA growth 
was higher than that of CEE and FSU in the initial reform years; and (c) why growth in SSA 
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Data source: calculated from FAO statistics.  
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Data source: calculated from FAO & ILO statistics. 
* Year 1 is start of reform. For details on country and time coverage, see Appendix. 
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Figure 3: Changes in average agricultural labour productivity (ALP) index during the 
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Data source: calculated from FAO statistics. 
 
 
Figure 4: Changes in average agricultural yield index during the first twelve years of 
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Data source: calculated from FAO statistics. 
Overall yields are calculated as simple averages of yields of roots & tubers, cereals, fibres, fruits, milk, 
vegetables, sugar crops, tobacco, nuts, pulses, spices, rubber and tobacco.   45
 
Figure 5: Changes in average Agricultural Area Index during the first twelve years of 
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Data source: calculated from FAO statistics. 
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Figure 6:  Contract separation with one-sided hold-up (with tx=tm =I/2; φ
f=0) 
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Figure 7: Agricultural Protection in different regions of the world 
 
Data Source: OECD (2008) and Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
 CEE includes: Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania   48
Figure 8: Structure of Gross Agricultural Output at time of reform and structural 
































Data source: calculated from FAO statistics. 
Animal products include eggs, meat and dairy products; Fruits and vegetables includes fruits, vegetables, spices 
and nuts; Industrial crops include coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, oil crops, tobacco, sugar crops and cotton; Roots and 
tubers include roots, pulses and tubers. 
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Figure 9: FDI growth (a: flows, b: stocks) after reforms 
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Data source: Dries et al. (2009). Data are from surveys of dairy companies in Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, 
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Figure 11: Changes in Gross Agricultural Output Index for Sub Sahara Africa across 
different commodity types 
 
Data source: calculated from FAO statistics. 
Cereals, roots and tubers include cereals, roots, tubers and pulses; Fruits and vegetables include fruits, 
vegetables, nuts and spices; Industrial crops include coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, oil crops and tobacco. 
 
Figure 12: Changes in Agricultural Labor Productivity Index for Sub Sahara Africa across 
different commodity types 
 
Data source: calculated and adapted from FAO statistics. 
Cereals, roots and tubers include cereals, roots, tubers and pulses; Fruits and vegetables include fruits, vegetables, 
nuts and spices; Industrial crops include coffee, cocoa, tea, rubber, oil crops and tobacco.   52
 
 







































Data source: calculated from FAO statistics 
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Data source: calculated from FAO statistics 
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Table 1: Regional Comparison of Reforms and Initial Conditions 
 
  CEE  FSU  East Asia  SSA 




10,069  4,364  674  1,429 
b. Agricultural price 
distortions 
 
Subsidized  Subsidized  Taxed  Taxed 
Reforms: 
 
Big bang  Big bang  Gradual  Mixed 
 
Data Source: World Bank (2006) 
With CEE= Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia 
With EA= China 
With FSU= as in appendix, but without Azerbaijan & Uzbekistan 
With SSA= as in appendix, but without Somalia & Tanzania 
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Appendix 
CEE  –  Central  &  Eastern  Europe  includes  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
FSU – Former Soviet Union includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
EA - East Asia includes China and Vietnam. 
SSA  -  Sub  Sahara  Africa  includes  all  African  countries  south  of  the  Sahara  except  for  Angola, 
Botswana, Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Namibia, Reunion, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland.  
 
Year of reform is set to 1978 for China; 1985 for Vietnam; 1989 for non-FSU Central & Eastern 
European countries; 1991 for FSU countries; first year of structural adjustment for SSA countries, i.e. 
the year in which the concerned country got its first structural adjustment loan from the WB (data 
collected from World Bank loan documents).  
 